

KEEN AS MUSTARD: Britain's horrific chemical warfare experiments in Australia by Bridget Goodwin. 361 pages. University of Queensland Press, Queensland, Australia. 1998. \$29.95.

Keen as Mustard is both important and terrible. It is important because Bridget Goodwin examines the history of chemical warfare and the use of human "volunteers" as guinea pigs for scientific testing. It is terrible because of how callously scientific and government leaders physically damaged young Australian military men. Only one member of the Australian Defence Committee considered the plight of these soldiers and expressed the view that it was inappropriate to use soldiers in experiments. His objections were "swiftly quashed."

The total absence of "informed consent" during these experiments is appalling. Informed consent is now an essential component of both health care and research, but it was not during World War II. Scientists not only exploited the absence of informed consent, they took advantage of the Australian temperament and intent to "uphold the national spirit of bravery, devotion to duty in the name of the British Empire and cheerfulness in the face of adversity." These soldiers would not "let down their mates" and drove on regardless of pain and discomfort.


The photographs that accompany the text are graphic. The idea that these soldiers ran obstacle courses and refused to be medically categorized as unfit to do their military duties is mind-boggling! Indeed, British and American chemical warfare officers did not believe their own soldiers would have continued when so disabled and in such pain.

Keen as Mustard clearly describes the long-lasting effects of chemical warfare. Goodwin sensitizes the reader to the difficulties volunteers faced as they tried, with little success, to convince the government to provide for their health care and pen-

sions. Their efforts substantiate the necessity of complete medical documentation of exposure and care after exposure.

Perhaps the information gleaned from the long-term suffering of Australian soldiers will induce America and its allies to carefully and seriously investigate any exposure to chemical weapons during deployments.

COL Gale S. Pollock, USA,
Fort Drum, New York



WARS OF IMPERIAL CONQUEST IN AFRICA, 1830-1914, by Bruce Vandervort. 274 pages. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. 1998. \$16.95.

Until recently, most of the literature concerning the conquest of Africa has been written from the conquerors' perspective. With Colonial Africa's demise, the "new" countries are retelling their stories from their point of view. Bruce Vandervort weds both viewpoints and presents a clearer picture of Africa's conquest. However, he does not limit himself to just reporting military actions, he puts those events into the social, political and economic setting that prevailed at the time.

There were two distinct periods during the subduing of Africa. The first was from 1876 to 1880 and covered the establishment of outposts along the coasts and the exploration of major African rivers. The

second period, beginning about 1880, covered the conquest of the remainder of the interior, which was aided by medical advances. The almost sure death by disease had kept the Europeans on the coast. The recruitment of natives into the army further enhanced local operations and reduced the number of European soldiers required for combat.

Another important area Vandervort examines is the social composition, armament, logistics, strategy, tactics and leadership of native armies, some of which were as well armed, including the possession of artillery, as the Europeans. Logistics was a tremendous problem for both sides, but especially for the Europeans. Tactically the Africans often threw away their advantage of superior mobility to fight stand-up battles, which they seldom won. Guerrilla warfare would have been a more successful strategy. Ethiopia was the only country successful in preserving its freedom.

This book is well organized, easy to read and extremely well researched. Its bibliography is extensive and comprehensive. It would make an excellent companion study with *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912* by Thomas Pakenham (Avon Books, New York, 1992).

MAJ William T. Bohne, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: Flirting with Disaster by Brian Mitchell. 374 pages. Regnery Publishing, Inc., Washington, DC. 1998. \$24.95.

In *Women in the Military: Flirting with Disaster*, Brian Mitchell, a well-known critic of women's roles in the military, provides an interesting chronology of women's contributions to national defense. Mitchell tackles the historical accuracy of stories of Molly Pitcher and Lucy Brewer. He attributes these "good

stories” to feminist historians who revised history to include women as “soldiers, sailors and secret agents” in an attempt to provide military women with a heritage of their own.

Establishing the tone of his argument up front, Mitchell provides a lengthy and often-detailed discussion about why women have been allowed to serve in the military. He also discusses the effects of gender integration on service academies, military tradition, morale and mission accomplishment.


Despite his bias, Mitchell’s fascinating book is easy to read. His subject continues to be controversial and one with which the military continues to grope despite its many years of trying to resolve. Mitchell argues that the military has been forced into political correctness by the times and by leaders who lack the integrity to tell it like it is. He cites the numerous disadvantages of allowing women in uniform: higher rates of attrition, greater need for medical care, higher rates of non-availability, lower rates of deployability and less physical ability. To this list he adds a number of problems aggravated by “substituting women for men,” including single parenthood, fraternization and sexual harassment. The only advantages he sees for allowing women in uniform is that they are “better behaved.” To cap his argument, he notes, “Women are no longer needed in the military. . . . Their expanding presence is destroying the military’s body and soul.”

Mitchell’s book is stimulating and thought provoking. Unfortunately, he undercuts the seriousness with which his arguments can be taken by the consistent use of patronizing, discrediting and emotionally charged language. For example, he describes women in administrative and clerical roles in World War II as “faithful and charming wartime secretaries.” Women veterans were “little more than window dressing.” Other remarks include: “Appearance was always important, even in Vietnam,” and “Power is a favorite word among feminists.”

A balanced use of comparison statistics would have lent more credibility to Mitchell’s arguments, al-

though he frequently claims comparisons were not available. He discredits anyone espousing support for women in the military as being afraid of the consequences of telling the truth. As a result, he comments “the modern military has trivialized combat as incidental to military service and relegated readiness to secondary status behind the more pressing concern for equal opportunity.” If this is the case, Mitchell’s failure to address positive contributions of women in the military and to entertain the notion that they may have a future role of value in defense of the nation lends credibility to the notion that this is not an objective assessment. However, the reader gets the feeling the author did not mean for it to be.

COL Ruth Cheney, USA, Retired,
Tacoma, Washington



THE RIGHT TO FIGHT: A History of African Americans in the Military by Gerald Astor. 576 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1998. \$29.95.

For two centuries, African Americans sought their right as Americans to participate fully and equally in America’s wars. From the beginning, the US government and military accepted the offer grudgingly, halfheartedly and belatedly. When allowed to participate, African Americans were segregated and discriminated against in role, opportunity and reward. Progress was slow, peaked during the Spanish-American War, then deteriorated as the American century slid toward Korea. Half a century and two world wars from the Spanish-American War, official segregation finally ended, but as late as the 1970s, the services

still did not offer equal opportunity to African Americans. By the 1990s, racism was finally anathema, and the services dealt with sporadic flare-ups case by case.

The Right to Fight is an overview of two centuries of African American military history and is the first to bring the information together into one book. The book also corrects errors of fact and interpretation in earlier histories of narrower scope. It incorporates memoirs, oral histories and interviews, including 60 the author conducted specifically for the book. A solid grasp of the literature undergirds a subjective, more personal story—one developed largely through the words of the participants, white and black, from G.I. to general. This use of first-person accounts is a method more common to journalism than to history, although social scientists, including newer historians, are moving in that direction.

By now the dismal story of American disservice to its African American warriors is familiar. A survey cannot be expected to bring startlingly new insights. However, this survey should not be dismissed. It is an easily digested, up-close-and-personal, solid work of history. It is a necessary corrective to past official histories based on the assumptions of the leaders who perpetuated the unjust system.

The book has one huge flaw—no footnotes. The success of the narrative depends on direct quotes from eyewitnesses. Quotation without attribution is a distracting if not disturbing feature in a serious history. Presidio Press and an author with half a dozen histories to his credit should know better. However, for readability and currency of interpretation, this book is well worth reading.

John H. Barnhill, Defense Megacenter,
Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma

MURDER IN THE NAME OF GOD: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin by Michael Karpin and Ina Friedman. 352 pages. Henry Holt and Co., New York. 1998. \$24.95.

Michael Karpin, one of Israel’s leading journalists, also anchors a news show in his native country. Ina Friedman is a Dutch journalist who immigrated to Israel in 1968.

Together they have written a compelling account of the events and atmosphere of hatred created by Israeli religious extremists that culminated in the tragic assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

The story begins with a reconstruction of the influences ultra-orthodox zealots had on Yigal Amir, Rabin's assassin. It highlights how, over a two-year period, Amir made the mental transformation from Yeshiva student to murderer. The authors also bring to life a who's who of right-wing Israeli extremists and the Likud administration's role in using such zealots to undermine Rabin, his Labor administration and the peace process.

Israel's mood after the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords was electric. Rabin saw that Israel's long-term survival depended on peace with the Palestinians, a view that earned him the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize. However, ultra-orthodox Jewish settlers assaulted members of Rabin's cabinet, chanting racial slurs outside his home. Members of their parties personally attacked him in the Knesset, Israel's parliament.

Like Islamic fundamentalists who issue religious edicts calling for the death of certain people, senior rabbis evoked ancient laws authorizing Rabin's death. These zealots twisted Judaic religious laws to justify their hatred of Arabs and secular Israelis and to call for Israel's expansion from the Nile to the Euphrates rivers as a divine right.

Before being killed by a Palestinian, Baruch Goldstein, an orthodox physician, fired an M-16 rifle into a group of Palestinians praying at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Ultra-orthodox groups and Jewish settlers hailed Goldstein as a hero. This atmosphere led an impressionable college student to take up the cause for these zealots and on 4 November 1995, he fatally shot Rabin.

Rabin had fought in every war in which Israel engaged, beginning in the 1948 War of Independence, in which he led a division that withdrew in the face of Jordanian forces and reconstituted itself to protect logistic routes and vital

roads of approach to Tel-Aviv. Zealots rejected this sound tactical decision and charged Rabin with cowardice.

Murder in the Name of God is an eye-opening book that looks intimately at the role right-wing Israelis play in undermining Israel's democracy and the peace process in the region. Those with an interest in antiterrorism and the Middle East should read this book.

LT Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN,
Great Lakes, Illinois



IN THE COMBAT ZONE: Special Forces Since 1945 by Robin Neillands. 350 pages. New York University Press, New York. 1998. \$25.95.

Robin Neillands concentrates on US and British units in what he calls "the story of special forces since 1945." His goal is to describe how special forces have "developed, expanded and changed." He also desires to dispel the "Rambo" myth of the typical special forces soldier.

A significant problem Neillands faces is one of definition. Early in the book, he advises the reader that all units mentioned are special forces (SF) or special operations forces (SOF). Later he admits that the term "special force"—a term not in the US military lexicon—has various meanings in different countries. He places US Army Special Forces, US Navy SEALs, the Army's Delta Force and the British Special Air Service in the SF category. He lumps parachute units, the US Marine Corps, US Army Rangers and the French Foreign Legion in the

SOF category. These categories are especially confusing for American readers because there is a clearly defined difference between the two components in the US military. For example, in the United States, Marines are not considered special operations forces.

Neillands ignores civil affairs, psychological operations and aviation units included in the US military definition. The British army also distinguishes between units that conduct special military operations, including SF operations, such as the Special Air Service and Special Boat Service, and conventional units having special purposes, such as parachute and marine units.

A second difficulty with the book is the large number of errors throughout. Neillands consistently refers to William Darby as William Derby. Colonel Aaron Bank is Colonel Aaron Banks. The 10th Special Forces Group was stationed at Bad Tolz, not Bad Totz. The helicopter is the UH-1, not the VH-1. The correct name is MacDill Air Force Base, not MacGill Air Force Base. He states that the US Army maintains a 30,000-man SF group at Fort Bragg, California. He is probably referring to the US Army Special Operations Command. Errors such as these severely detract from the reader's willingness to accept the authenticity of Neillands' story.

Neillands set himself too big a task. Although he correctly begins by establishing a definition for the scope of his subject, the definition is too broad and, for US and British readers, immediately brings into question the author's understanding of SOF. At one point he even states that artillery and logistic units can be included as SOF because of those units' unique capabilities. He would have done better to define the type units he is examining by using the definitions of those units as established in official publications. This would have eliminated a considerable amount of confusion. Also, the author or his editor should have checked the facts before sending the book to the printer.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: International Relations and Customary International Law by Michael Byers. 250 pages. Cambridge University Press, Port Chester, NY. 1999. \$54.95.

From the beginning, *Custom, Power and the Power of Rules* reads like a Ph.D. dissertation. And it is, although it is a "substantially revised version." Chapter section headings such as "The Epistemological Circle" and "*Jus Cogens* and *Erga Omnes* Rules" make clear this book is not for the faint of heart.

Michael Byers was degreed in international relations before he began his legal studies. With this book, he attempts to illustrate the confluence of international relations and international law and how an interdisciplinary approach would strengthen understanding of international law. He asserts that few international lawyers have examined the role of power in international law and that his book discusses the subject in ways that distinguish it from previous treatments.

Byers' thesis that international law is buoyed by the inevitability of states ignoring their own short-term interests in favor of less concrete advantages beyond the horizon is contradicted by the current actions of the United States and its NATO allies in Serbia and Iraq. In these cases, the actors appear to have decided that if the object of aggression is a mean-spirited dictator, short-term goals outweigh international law. This does not fit Byers' theory.


Byers gives an interesting illustration of overflight rights. When the first satellite was launched into orbit, there was no hue and cry about violations of national sovereignty. The right of satellites to overfly nations without asking permission immediately calcified into customary international law—once again demonstrating how one or two powerful states can make law. In contrast, during World War I, the rule allowing the free overflight of aircraft quickly changed to a restrictive regime when nations began to realize the tactical implications of such overflights. The same situation serves as an example of instant customary law, an unwelcome concept

to many who believe it stretches the concept of "customary" beyond the breaking point.

Ultimately, Byers concludes that international law is a stable system that has evolved from each nation's acceptance of the process of rule making rather than the acceptance of each individual rule, and that "shared understanding" plays a significant role in transforming practices into binding international rules.

Readers will find significant portions of this book tough sledding. Even with an international law background, I scurried for my texts on a couple of occasions. Those without an academic background in international law will find the subject particularly difficult.

MAJ Gary D. Brown, USAF,
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska



GLEN EDWARDS: The Diary of a Bomber Pilot edited by Daniel Ford. 195 pages. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, DC. 1998. \$24.95.

In the early 1950s, I saw Danny Kaye perform in the movie *The Secret Lives of Walter Mitty* (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1947, available on VHS). One vignette portrayed Mitty's daydream of being a dashing Air Force officer. It was a powerful image—a teenage colonel, lightning all over his hat and ribbons stretching from his waist over his shoulder. Mitty's version was a flamboyant playboy/officer with plenty of activity but not much direction. At that moment I little dreamed I would spend 27 years in that service. In *Glen Edwards*, Daniel Ford presents us with a case

study that suggests Mitty's caricature had some basis in fact, but Ford well knows that the vision and Glen Edwards were of an old Air Force, long since disappeared.

Ford, an Army veteran, has a long, impressive record as a novelist and editor. He is blessed with a splendid writing style and understands the modern Air Force. Reading his book is a real treat. For me it was nostalgia. The Air Force had not changed that much in the five years between Edwards' death and my entry. In fact, I actually flew some of the same airplanes he had flown. But the book is a striking demonstration of how much the world has changed. Although the book is a bit on the sketchy side, it portrays the flavor of the times.

Glen Edwards was a bomber pilot from the beginning, but his combat experience was in the A-20, a single-pilot plane dedicated to a mission now covered by fighters such as the A-10 or F-16. Training in those helter-skelter times of the African Campaign was only a lick and a promise and much shorter and cheaper than it is now. One consequence was that the definition of a bomber pilot was much looser than it has become.

After returning from Africa, Edwards was assigned to testing, sometimes flying a bomber, a transport and a fighter all in the same day. Clearly, there was little discipline in it all, which was one reason the death of a buddy was almost a daily occurrence.

Another contributor to the high death rate, which would horrify today's airmen, was the fact that heavy drinking was much more common. The early Air Force little heeded the limits on crew duty days or the need for crew rest. Edwards and the other pilots often stayed out all night carousing, then fell into the cockpit with little or no sleep.

The great value of this book is that it gives perspective and shows how far we have come. As impressive as Edwards' achievements and courage were, it reminds us of the great value of a professional approach to both war and flying. Although the Air Force has now been

drawn down to about the same size it was when Edwards' flying wing crashed into the California desert, both the professional quality of its personnel and the excellence of its technology make it far more potent than it was back then.

David R. Mets, *School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama*

PRISONERS OF THE NAZIS: Accounts of American POWs in World War II edited by Harry Spiller. 212 pages. McFarland & Co., Inc., Jefferson, NC. 1998. \$27.50.

DAVAI, DAVAI! Memoir of a German Prisoner of World War II in the Soviet Union by A.D. Hans Schuetz. 162 pages. McFarland & Co., Inc., Jefferson, NC. 1997. \$28.50.

A half-century after the end of World War II, a number of memoirs of "the Good War" have emerged. Veterans, especially those with prisoner of war (POW) experience, suppressed their demons with work and family. For some, retirement brought those demons back.

While these two books might provide a good outlet for emotions, they might be less useful to scholars. *Prisoners of the Nazis* is simply a collection of oral histories of the POW experience in Europe. No cross checking or questioning appears to have been done, and some memories seem unlikely. The original perception might have been inaccurate, or it may have been blurred with time or contaminated by later information. More credible memories concern the trauma of capture and the joy of liberation.

Late in the war, ex-POWs were used to guard Axis prisoners. From the memories described, that was not a good idea. Ex-POWs were less than sympathetic and more than angry. Appendixes showing locations of POW camps in Europe and detailing German regulations regarding POWs, including specifically Jewish POWs, may be of interest to scholars.

"Davai, davai" is Russian for "move along, move along." The book is the rather perfunctory recollection of a German sergeant captured by Russians in the last weeks of the war. Like many German soldiers, he was

held for several years after the war and forced to perform slave labor.

Knowledge of survival in Soviet camps is still valuable. Although the "Evil Empire" is gone, the people responsible for its prisons have gone on to other employers. The book provides little information on survival in POW camps, but it does provide a view of postwar Soviet life.

Together these two books give the reader a "tour" through the horrors of captivity and trumpet the resilience of those who endured.

Kevin L. Jamison, *Kansas City, Missouri*



STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT: Vietnam in Retrospect by U.S.G. Sharp. 352 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1998. \$17.95.

Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp believes political limitations imposed from Washington prevented US air power from gaining victory in Vietnam. Sharp, Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) from 1964 to 1968, commanded the US air effort over Vietnam. It is safe to say that most airmen share Sharp's verdict that the "flawed policies and methods that controlled the use of air and naval power" represented "the most asinine way to fight a war that could possibly be imagined."

Sharp particularly targets "gradualism" strikes, which are limited in time, space and intensity in order to "signal intent" to opponents, that characterized US air power in Vietnam. He believed they directly resulted from a flawed political-military relationship where the

naivete and ignorance of civilian policy makers led them to ignore the wise counsel of military professionals.

In several ways, Sharp's book is an air power analogue to retired Army Colonel Harry Summers' well-known Vietnam postmortem, *On Strategy* (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1995). Like Summers, Sharp believes that North Vietnam's center of gravity was its conventional war-making ability. The US military had the aerial capability to destroy it, or at least make its continued use prohibitively expensive, but lacked the will to do so. Sharp's introduction notes with satisfaction that the results of the Gulf War—overwhelming victory through unshackled air power—demonstrate how well we have learned the lessons he illuminated 20 years ago in the first edition of this book.

In 1978 Sharp expressed the fear that those who forget the lessons of the past are doomed to repeat them. A valid criticism of his book would be that those who remember are equally likely to repeat them, with similarly unhappy consequences. In any event, the past's lessons are often veiled and elusive. A couple of observations, however, are clear and unambiguous. The aircrews who pressed on to their targets in the skies over Vietnam continuously demonstrated great courage and determination. To contend that their efforts were largely futile in no way denigrates their competence and bravery. Another is that the issues Sharp raises do merit consideration.

Readers of this book should also seek out Mark Clodfelter's *The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (The Free Press, New York, 1989) and John Warden's *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (Diane Publishing, Upland, PA. 1988).

LTC Alan Cate, *USA, Fort Jackson, South Carolina*

STUMBLING COLOSSUS: The Red Army on the Eve of World War by David M. Glantz. 374 pages. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1998. \$39.95.

In *Stumbling Colossus*, David M. Glantz has produced a strong work that presents its case with vigor.

But, with its dry style and overwhelming data, it is certainly written for Soviet military history specialists. The book is not easy to read.

To understand Glantz's thesis, one must know some of the background of the historiographic battle over the origins of the German invasion of Russia. Fortunately, Glantz's introduction provides an excellent guide to this debate. The earliest, 'conventional' interpretations saw Adolf Hitler's invasion as an aggressive act with little or no justification. However, a recent school of thought, spawned by Victor Rezun (also known as Viktor Suvorov) in his book *Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?* (out of print), argues that Joseph Stalin had aggressive designs, and that to some degree, Hitler's attack was a justified preemptive strike.

On several accounts, Glantz takes to task Rezun and the school that

views Hitler's invasion as a justified act. He criticizes Rezun's lack of archival research and finds fault with Rezun's use of memoir material, which is often quoted out of context. Glantz correctly emphasizes that Marshal Georgi Zhukov's preparation in the summer of 1941 of an offensive plan was simply prudent staff work, not evidence of Soviet aggression. Glantz also asserts that the Red Army's vast unpreparedness on the eve of the German invasion is ample proof that the Soviets, in particular Stalin, would not have contemplated a preemptive strike. This last claim is the book's basis.

Almost all of the chapters are devoted exclusively to proving the ill-prepared status of the Red Army on the eve of World War II. In one form or another, Glantz masses overwhelming evidence for his claim that the Soviets were unprepared for war. Page after page of

after-action reviews, readiness reports and statistical data present a powerful case, but they also make the narrative dry and repetitious. Also, Glantz's sources are published versions of archival material and are not from the archives themselves, but there is no reason to doubt their accuracy.

This is not a book for the casual reader. It will probably be of most use to the specialist interested in extensive detail on the Red Army on the eve of the war.

MAJ Curtis S. King, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack by Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley A. Thayer. 354 pages. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1998. \$22.50.

In the post-Cold War era, the fundamental question for those who

Pass in Review

EMOTION, CHARACTER AND RESPONSIBILITY

by John Sabini and Maury Silber. 192 pages. Oxford University Press, New York. 1998. \$24.95.

Emotion, Character and Responsibility examines human behavior based on philosophy enlightened by psychology and physiology. It is a "logic trail" dissection of the relationship among the three elements of the book title. To present arguments in a concise, efficient and persuasive style, the authors had to assume the reader to have a rich knowledge and background in the field. The subject is important, but the approach is better suited for the academic or specialist.—COL James D. Blundell, USA, Retired, Arlington, Virginia

HURRICANE OF FIRE: The Union Assault on Fort Fisher

by Charles M. Robinson III. 249 pages. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD. 1998. \$29.95.

Hurricane of Fire is about the US Navy's blockade of confederate ports during the Civil War. Author Charles M. Robinson III provides a detailed history of the seizure of Fort Fisher, the island fortification that was home to a combined force of navy, army and marine troops who protected the Port of Wilmington, North Carolina. Robinson contends that at the time, the capture of Fort Fisher was of greater strategic value than the closure of any other Southern port. This book will be of interest to die-hard Civil War buffs.—LTC James P. Hartman, USA, Retired, Aiken, South Carolina

ALLIANCE POLITICS

by Glenn H. Snyder. 414 pages. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 1997. \$39.95.

The role of military alliances in shaping international politics is the focus of Glenn H. Snyder's study of a key period in European history—the pivotal years from 1870 to 1914. Intent on developing a theory to explain and predict the value of alliances, Snyder examines the historical record to illustrate ways countries bargain for security and relative strength. His discussions of alliances among European powers shows how quickly political leaders can shift partners to obtain advantage over perceived enemies. Snyder's highly specialized discussion of political theory might intimidate some, but for those who are truly interested in the relationship between politics and the military, reading *Alliance Politics* is worth the effort.—LTC Laurence W. Mazzeno, USA, Retired, Wyomissing, Pennsylvania

determine US national security is what are the main threats to the United States and its vital national interests? With the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has no peer competitor. Even in the worst-case scenario, experts believe it would take at least 25 years for China to become a near-peer competitor. However, the United States will not be free from significant risk in the first quarter of the 21st century. There is consensus that proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology already bodes ill for three conflict-prone regions of critical US interest—the Far East, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East.

Unchecked proliferation may eventually pose a serious threat to US homeland defense. In addition, some strategists believe the United States should prepare now for asynchronous warfare (economic, political

and military). They believe we are wide open to asymmetric attacks and attempts by states and non-state groups, individually or in concert, to circumvent or undermine US strengths and exploit US weaknesses.

The authors of *America's Achilles' Heel* make 13 recommendations for reducing our vulnerability and increasing our ability to contain, withstand and respond to the most devastating forms of this threat.

They acknowledge that simple, widely available conventional explosives and rifles can be extremely effective and will likely be the weapons of choice in asymmetric attacks against the United States at home and abroad for the foreseeable future. But they also build a clear, if not completely convincing, case of an increasing threat of attack by extremely lethal nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, especially covert use of relatively easy

to build and deploy chemical and biological weapons.

Without providing a cookbook for terrorists, the authors carefully and thoroughly explain the plausible acquisition and clandestine delivery of NBC weapons by hostile states, including Iraq and North Korea, and non-state actors, including ethnic groups, militias, liberation armies, organized crime syndicates and the lunatic fringe. They find the probability of use low but adverse consequences high.

The book ends with the story of Achilles, whose mother dipped her infant son into a magic stream to give him invulnerability to mortal weapons. The only spot on his body left unprotected was the heel by which she held him as he was immersed. As an adult, Achilles became a great warrior who took pride in his invincibility. However, in a fit of rage, the arrogant Achilles

WAY STATION TO SPACE:
A History of the John C. Stennis
Space Center by Mack R. Herring.
484 pages. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC. 1997.
\$37.00.

The John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC) is the "lead center for rocket testing" for both NASA and the nation. *Way Station to Space* is the story of how the SSC came to achieve that designation. Of special note is the section about the Saturn V first- and second-stage rocket motors that were understood to be the "pacing item" for the entire Apollo program. Herring aptly describes the pressure the Stennis team felt over this designation and their determination to succeed. However, having been a public information officer for NASA and the SSC for over 30 years clouds his objectivity. The reader should not expect a penetrating critique.—CPT Todd Laughman, USAF, Dulles, Virginia


BORDER CONFLICT:
Villistas, Carrancistas and the
Punitive Expedition, 1915-1920,
by Joseph A. Stout. 198 pages.
Texas Christian University Press,
Fort Worth, TX. 1999. \$24.95.

In *Border Conflict*, Joseph A. Stout discusses the well-known but little understood period in US-Mexico relations punctuated by Brigadier General John J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition. While the exhibition was ostensibly directed against Pancho Villa's activities, particularly his attack on Columbus, New Mexico, Stout places it in wider focus. The conflict in northern Mexico began as a struggle between the Mexican national government and Villa's forces. Only after the raid on Columbus did it involve US forces. To a large extent, however, the Punitive Expedition and the Mexican action reflected a reaction to domestic politics as much as it was an attempt at rational foreign policy. This is a truth that military strategists must remember even more today. While the reader never gets a feel for why Pershing moved the way he did, and given that the geography is unfamiliar to all but a few specialists, the one map accompanying the text is clearly inadequate. Nevertheless, this small volume places the Expedition in its proper international focus. In this way, it is superior to most works on the expedition, which concentrate almost exclusively on Pershing's actions.—LTC James J. Dunphy, USAR, Fairfax, Virginia

desecrated the body of his greatest opponent—Hector. This angered the god Apollo, who knew of Achilles' vulnerability. Later, as Achilles fought a lesser adversary, Apollo guided an arrow to Achilles' heel, mortally wounding the warrior who had believed he was invincible. The heel was the hero's vulnerability, but hubris proved his greatest weakness.

Thus, the authors' indirect answer to the crucial national security question is complacency. Those who are on active duty should probably pay more attention to the vulnerabilities and risks of covert NBC attacks in their areas of responsibility. Unfortunately, templates for military analysis of the covert NBC threat and other types of asymmetric approaches to warfare at the tactical and operational levels do not exist. If enough analysts and the right officials at the national strategic level read this book, that should not be a problem for long.

LTC Kenneth H. Pritchard, USA,
Retired, Lusby, Maryland



MILITARY QUOTATIONS FROM THE CIVIL WAR IN THE WORDS OF THE COMMANDERS by Peter G. Tsouras. 288 pages. Sterling Publishing Co., New York. 1998. \$29.95.

Peter Tsouras says little about the intent or purpose of his book of Civil War quotations beyond such phrases as to "tell the story from the general's particular perspective" or "to discuss age-old problems of

the art of war." Although "Commanders" is in the title of this book, it should more accurately read "Leaders."

The book is a welcome companion to Edward L. Ayers' *A House Divided: A Century of Great Civil War Quotations* (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1997) and Darryl Lyman's *Civil War Wordbook: Including Sayings, Phrases and Expletives* (Combined Books, Conshohocken, PA, 1994). Some of Tsouras' selections bear the dryness of subjects with which we are long familiar—religious sentiment, honor, glory—to logistics and maneuverability. However, these quotes retain their genuine and immutable character despite our familiarity with the themes. Readers will also benefit from the wide range of lesser quotes.

Unwittingly perhaps, Tsouras presents a revealing book since much is revealed by what these commanders do *not* say. For instance, Major General Oliver O. Howard speaks in admirable terms of men carrying the

"SURROUNDED BY DANGERS OF ALL KINDS":

The Mexican War Letters of Lieutenant Theodore Laidley
edited by James M. McCaffrey.
University of North Texas Press,
Amarillo, TX. 1997. \$25.00.

"*Surrounded by Dangers of All Kinds*" is quite enlightening. The letters contain Lieutenant Theodore Laidley's fears, frustrations and celebrations, describing the war from the perspective of a combat support officer rather than a combat arms officer. The book focuses primarily on Laidley's service in the Mexican War, but the reader also gets a glimpse of his entire career. The book also points out that soldiers of faith, regardless of religious background, desire a chaplain to serve with them. As a chaplain, I know today's soldiers share these emotions.—MAJ Thomas Condry, USA, Fort Riley, Kansas

BEYOND THE WILD BLUE:

A History of the U.S. Air Force
by Walter J. Boyne. 442 pages. St.
Martin's Griffin, New York. 1998.
\$17.95.

Beyond the Wild Blue is a well-written but unbalanced work. It suffers from its strong partisan approach and heavy disdain for Air Force critics and nonsupporters. Author Walter J. Boyne includes good material on Air Force leaders, doctrine and organization development, technology, supply, the space program and other aspects not always found in one volume. There are detailed appendixes and a chronology of aerospace history. Unfortunately, the limited bibliography fails to include several important sources. Despite its weaknesses, the book is useful as a handy, generally reliable reference.—COL Stanley L. Falk, USA, Retired, Alexandria, Virginia

BUFF FACINGS AND GILT BUTTONS: Staff and Headquarters Operations in the Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1865, by J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, SC. 1999. \$29.95.

Just when you think everything has been written about the Civil War, a new book appears that takes a different approach. Instead of dealing with individual battles and the memoirs of men who participated in them, J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. surveys the entire scope of Confederate General Robert E. Lee's staff operations and examines how Lee's officers were selected, trained and organized. And, although Lee's staff reflected the traditional style of staff operations more than the emerging system in Europe, his army still managed to remain in the field for four years against a superior foe and under difficult conditions.—Bud Feuer, Roanoke, Virginia

colors against enemy guns. Did this admiration underlie Howard's needlessly launched and doomed uphill assault against entrenched Confederate positions at Pickett's Mill? And, although General Ulysses S. Grant could boast of having "never spared lives to gain an object," we are aware of his deep regret over ordering a final, doomed charge at Cold Harbor. Tsouras reminds us that such contradictions in behavior represent the complexities of human nature. We glimpse a telling psychology between the lines of many of these quotations, such as General Stonewall Jackson's statement that "War . . . is the sum of all evils," and General William Tecumseh Sherman's, "War is at best barbarism."

Sometimes the idealism embedded in pronouncements by variously laureled, high-ranking officers did not result in plausible registrations of actuality. Therefore, I recommend balancing Tsouras' book with others that cite quotes from common sol-

diers, whose words bequeath visceral elegy, imagistic power and emotional resonance. Admittedly, it is easy to criticize a book of quotations, because readers will always think of a phrase the author could have included. Therefore, despite these criticisms, readers will find in Tsouras' book much time-honored wisdom.

MAJ Jeffrey Alfier, USAF,
Tucson, Arizona

FACE OF EMPIRE: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946, by Frank Hindman Golay. 550 pages. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI. 1998. \$59.95.

Frank Hindman Golay spent his professional career studying Philippine economic development. While writing *Face of Empire*, he became dissatisfied with the state of scholarship concerning the US colonial enterprise in the Philippines. He became convinced that a small number of available secondary works were being cited to an extent that

they overshadowed primary sources as well as other secondary materials of greater historical importance. After retiring, Golay embarked on this study to redress the perceived imbalance.

Toward the end of his writing effort, Golay called this book "a monstrous manuscript surveying American colonial rule in the Philippines, which has burdened my waking hours for eight years." It was not until three years after his death that his widow released the manuscript for publication. The editors discovered mistakes in many of the footnotes and asked for the professor's research notes. Several weeks later a huge crate arrived containing a "wall-high stack of metal filing drawers, crammed with three-by-five-inch cards, each covered with handwritten notes from Golay's long hours of painstaking archival research." Editing the manuscript was a long process but resulted in one of the few surveys of US colonial rule of the Philippines.

SECRET WAR IN SHANGHAI: An Untold Story of Espionage, Intrigue and Treason in World War II by Bernard Wasserstein. 354 pages. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA. 1999. \$26.00.

In *Secret War in Shanghai*, Bernard Wasserstein chronicles activities of foreigners, businessmen and adventurers in Shanghai during World War II. However, the book contributes little to either the growing amount of scholarship surrounding World War II code breaking and espionage organizations or to Shanghai's history. Instead, it is about pimps, prostitutes, con men and scam artists who populated Shanghai's foreign concessions. Wasserstein describes no events of any importance and no personalities of great note. While there was a slight chance he could explicate some of the history of the "Shanghai mind" and inform us about the various foreign institutions the city bred, Wasserstein instead gives a superficial treatment of the various foreign "bad hats" who called the city home. This gives the book a certain zest and charm, but it sheds no light on Shanghai's history and institutions.—Lewis Bernstein, *Combined Arms Center History Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE ODYSSEY OF A SOUTHERNER: The Life and Times of Gustavus Woodson Smith by Leonne M. Hudson. 244 pages. Mercer University Press, Macon, GA. 1998. \$32.00.

In a game of Civil War "what ifs," the experience of Major General Gustavus Woodson Smith gives one to ponder. What if, after the wounding of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston at the battle of Seven Pines in June of 1862, Smith, who was the next ranking officer after Johnston, had effectively assumed command and President Jefferson Davis had then retained Smith as commander rather than appoint Robert E. Lee? This speculation shows how chance events could indeed influence important events. This biography of a fascinating character examines both the civilian and military careers of a less known, and occasional, player in the 19th century as an army officer, politician and businessman. The book is well worth reading.—COL Earl E. Perry, USA, Retired, Jacksonville, Florida


One of the interpretative threads running through the book is Golay's dislike for and disapproval of the domination of weaker powers by stronger ones. He did not like any form of imperialism, believing it stunts a people's initiative, enterprise and stamina. He believed imperialism, whether undertaken by Asians, Europeans or Americans in Asia, Africa, Latin America or Eastern Europe, results in economic, cultural and political retardation.

After the United States began governing the islands in the early 20th century, it promoted progressive reforms, emphasizing increased self-government and economic progress. Appalled at the extent of local corruption, its response was to centralize power, drastically decreasing local autonomy. The results are evident today in Manila's political and economic primacy in the islands.

Another thread in the story's tapestry is the way in which the Philippines became a staple in US domestic political debates between 1898 and 1946. Golay points out that neither US political party wanted the Philippines to become a new state. They differed only in their beliefs on the speed with which the Philippines should be made independent. The Republican Party consistently held to a progressive-imperialist stance and advocated a long stage of political and economic tutelage. The Democratic Party advocated giving the islands independence as soon as possible to prevent commodities from the Philippines from competing with US farm products. Both opposed free Filipino migration to the United States.

The book is filled with interesting anecdotes and covers the full range of economic and political issues in Fil-American relations and deals with recent Filipino history in an accessible way. After finishing this book, the reader is more conscious of the Philippines' socio-political convulsions over the past century. I recommend it to readers who have an interest in the Philippines or Latin American history and politics.

Lewis Bernstein,
Combined Arms Center History
Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



AFGHANISTAN: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid by Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby. 274 pages. Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 1998. \$30.00.

With the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the world's fickle attention shifted from that war-ravaged land. Since then, only occasionally have events in Afghanistan made more than a ripple among the major headlines. This is unfortunate, for the fighting did not stop.

Afghanistan is in its 20th year of continuous warfare. The underlying rationale for combat shifts among tribal, ethnic, ideological and religious differences, but the civil war still rages.

Nations that backed various Afghan factions during the Cold War era have shown little real interest in pushing for peace and reconstruction. Kabul, the capital city, only recently had its electricity restored, and Afghanistan ranks among the world's poorest countries. The countryside is ravaged, the land sewn with millions of mines. The best and brightest of its population have begun new lives in other lands.

Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby, recognized authorities on the area, have written a short, compelling book that provides a concise history of this proud, ancient civilization and updates the reader with events to mid-1997. It is a welcome volume, joining Barnett R. Rubin's *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1995); Olivier Roy's *The Failure of Political Islam* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994); and Rasool Bakhsh Rais' *War Without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition*

After the Cold War (Oxford University Press, NY, 1994). All are major works about the country following the Soviet army's withdrawal.

By virtue of its geographic location, Afghanistan plays an important role in regional stability and has frequently been the center of the great powers' attention. Afghanistan will continue to be a critical area as the Silk Road reopens and the oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea basin and surrounding areas are developed and exported.

Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, China and Saudi Arabia have been expanding their commerce, ties and influence in the newly independent republics of Central Asia. Regional stability is essential for many of the development projects proposed for the area. An unstable Afghanistan threatens fragile economies, agreements and alliances. China and particularly Pakistan need reliable roads through Afghanistan to develop their trade with Central Asia.

Traditional Afghan Islam, the experience of Afghan-style Marxism and the militant Islam of the Jihad are now part and parcel of the shared Afghan experience. Each will impact the future of Afghanistan and its neighbors. This book explores the roots and power of each of these cultural forces and uses them to guide the reader in understanding what their combined impact might be. Although the United States has not been actively engaged in Afghanistan for several years, this cannot last. The concerned citizen and the professional soldier need to be aware of the region and cognizant of the future role Afghanistan will play.

Lester W. Grau,
Foreign Military Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MYTH, MANIFESTO, MELTDOWN: Communist Strategy, 1848-1991, by Edward M. Collins. 256 pages. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT. 1998. \$59.95.

According to Edward M. Collins, communist strategy has been both the expression and intellectual prisoner of the communist myth of Marxism-Leninism. Many strategies struggled for supremacy before the Bolshevik Revolution, but after 1917 the Soviet Union as an ideological state

was both subordinate to its world communist strategy and suppressor of all others who sought to deviate from its interpretation of that strategy. Communist strategy molded the infrastructure, mission and policies of the communist bloc, thus making the Cold War inevitable.

Collins traces the ideological roots of Marxism, the impact of Vladimir Lenin as a practical revolutionary and how domestic constraints within revolutionary and Stalinist Russia shaped the terror and propaganda tools of revolution and the organizational principles that controlled communist movements for over 80 years.

Collins clearly explains complex intellectual concepts. His precise summary of fundamental precepts of Marxism and Leninism is especially succinct. He even manages to make later portions on post-World War II ideology, largely drawn from speeches and communist party tracts, accessible. His book is also valuable in tracing Marxism's European roots, the impact of Russia's expropriation and mutilation of the doctrine and attempts by Eurocommunists, Chinese and Yugoslav theorists to offer alternatives.

By ending his story with 1991, however, Collins falls into the trap of suggesting that with the fall of Soviet Russia, communism died. Cold-War communist parties still rule in several countries, and even in post-Warsaw Pact Europe revamped communist parties continue to compete for political power.

Collins examines military strategy from 1964 to 1989, but he is mostly interested in military affairs within the context of the Cold-War arms race. Skewed allocation of resources to the military did bring the Soviet Union superpower status and ultimately contributed to its economic meltdown. That discussion, however, seems more focused on great-power rivalry than ideology. What I would have found just as interesting is a discussion of the ideas of early Soviet military thinkers who in the 1920s and 1930s attempted to translate Marxism-Leninism into military doctrine.

A problem I had with this book was its discussion of the influence of the US Communist Party in the pre-war period. Collins, a former deputy

director for Foreign Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, argues that Russia sought to delay a feared Japanese attack in the Far East by gaining greater influence—possibly “hegemony”—over US, British and French policies toward China and Japan. Moscow penetrated US think tanks and government agencies to mold public opinion to support a boycott and embargo of Japanese goods, which infuriated Tokyo, shifted attention from the Soviet Union to the United States and led to the Japanese attack.

Collins presents this theory, posing it as a question (“Can we conclude. . . ?”). He then sidesteps his thesis by noting that because outside events, Japanese behavior and other influences played a major role, it cannot be established that US Communist Party influence indirectly led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The entire topic feels like an add-on. Once he brought it up, he should have done more than conclude “maybe.”

This book is not an “easy read.” It is not designed as a primer for those unfamiliar with Marxist doctrine. However, it is valuable in examining a longer period than most similar books and especially in taking seriously how hacks such as Leonid I. Brezhnev produced strategy. The sad fact is not just that Soviet leaders put this doctrine out for mass consumption, but that they really believed it and let it influence their actions.

LTC Dianne Smith, *AFCENT*,
Brunssum, Netherlands


THE DEADLY BROTHERHOOD: The American Combat Soldier in World War II by John C. McManus. 353 pages. Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1998. \$28.95.

Do you want to know what the World War II foot soldier felt and how he fought? What he ate and how he liked it? What his life was like during periods when he was not in combat? *The Deadly Brotherhood* goes a long way toward answering such questions.

To capture the life and feelings of an ordinary rifleman during World War II, John C. McManus uses data gleaned from memoirs of and questionnaires from participants. He also used information from the archives

of the Special Collections Library and the Center for the Study of War and Society at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and the holdings of the US Army Military History Institute at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The book covers the entire picture—what weapons the soldiers fired, how they felt toward leaders, how they felt about German and Japanese adversaries, what it was like to become a casualty and how the replacement system worked.

The last chapter sums up this vast array of information. Throughout the dangerous experience of combat,



the primary motivation to endure was devotion to one's comrades. It was the “brotherhood” that carried these men through the worst of times.

Each chapter contains a wealth of supporting comments. This approach produces an extreme degree of authenticity, but sometimes one feels he is reading an encyclopedia of combat reaction. On each page, from three to six veterans are quoted on any given topic. One also wonders whether the respondents were truly representative. It would seem that the most literate were more apt to recap their feelings. Also, it is often easier to criticize than to praise. For example, in the leadership chapter, we learn that “most combat soldiers agree that, by and large, their officers did a good job.” Yet the ensuing commentary gives more space to criticism than to praise.

McManus expands several topics. The most provocative is the validity of S.L.A. Marshall's assertion that only 15 to 25 percent of US soldiers fired their weapons during World War II. Military writers have

accepted this statement without documentary evidence. The author tells us that World War II infantryman Harold Linebaugh along with Roger Spiller of the US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, have provided enough evidence to prove Marshall wrong. (*Editor's note: For a discussion of this topic, see "Letters to the Editor" on page 2.*)

Overall, this fine book provides a comprehensive understanding of a World War II infantryman's troubles and travails. However, I feel an adjective other than "deadly" could have been used with "brotherhood" to describe the sacrifice, love and memory of World War II veterans. But I haven't yet come up with the word.

COL Brooks E. Kleber, USAR,
Retired, Newport News, Virginia

THE TEST OF BATTLE: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign by Paul F. Braim. 247 pages. White Mane Books, Shippensburg, PA. 1998. \$35.00.

This is the second revised edition of Paul F. Braim's doctoral dissertation turned into a book. The work differs significantly from the early one—all for the better. A number of passages have been revised, there is one additional chapter, and Braim has considerably expanded his concluding analysis in light of recent scholarship, guidance and assistance from fellow scholars. The result is a more sympathetic assessment of the decisions of leaders at all levels in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign and a less condemnatory analysis of the American Expeditionary Forces' (AEF's) performance.

Braim's thesis remains the same—that AEF participation in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign resulted in a decisive US victory and contributed to the overall Allied cause. However, it was not the only or most decisive Allied offensive of World War I.

To Braim's credit, he does not merely focus on the Meuse-Argonne Campaign; he explains related Allied political, diplomatic and military maneuvers and results between themselves and the Germans on the Western, Eastern and Italian fronts. All of this is vital background information that sets the stage for the AEF's "test of battle"

in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.

Braim clearly draws a portrait that allows readers to visually participate in the Allied 1918 counter-offensive. The US role in the counterattack was to reduce the German salient behind the village of St. Mihiel, France. Although not part of the original plan, the AEF would then attack the main German front to the northwest of Verdun, through the heavily fortified terrain bounded by the Meuse River on the east and the Argonne Forest on the west. The AEF objective was the important German-held railroad center at Sedan.

The tale that unfolds follows a predictable path beginning with the St. Mihiel Campaign and progresses largely according to US plans because the attack caught the Germans in the middle of a planned tactical withdrawal.

Aptly, Braim describes this operation as a good "shakedown" for part of the US forces and that the most experienced US divisions would not be available for the start of the greatest effort to come—the Meuse-Argonne attack. However, he fails to mention that capturing the St. Mihiel salient deprived the Germans of a jumping-off point from which to attack the rear of any Allied advance into the Argonne region.

When French General Ferdinand Foch, the "coordinator" of all Allied armies, launched the Meuse-Argonne offensive on 26 September 1918, it was a different story. The Germans had completed their planned tactical withdrawal to strong defensive positions. American "doughboys" ad-

vanced up two narrow valleys toward the strategic heights of Montfoucau while being exposed to murderous German enfilade fire.

The number of US casualties was staggering, but General John J. Pershing, commander of the AEF, having the advantage of sheer numbers, mounted one attack after another throughout the month of October. The campaign lasted for 47 days, ending on 11 November 1918—soon to be known as Armistice Day.

Eventually, AEF soldiers penetrated the three strong German defensive lines, breaking German resistance. Farther to the rear, the German army, navy, government and society were disintegrating amid the serious attrition caused by a navy mutiny, political unrest and growing famine.

Braim supports his thesis with thorough research and analysis. The book is replete with appendixes, maps, photographs, endnotes and an extensive bibliography. There is also an excellent index. He presents the arguments of those who think AEF participation in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign was the decisive point of the war and those who did not.

Historian John Giles concluded that "had the war gone into 1919, the Americans would have had to bear the brunt of the fighting and could then have been considered to have won the war for the Allies, but it just did not turn out that way." In the end, Braim agrees with Giles, and I agree with Braim.

MAJ Glenn E. Gutting, LAARNG,
Fayetteville, Arkansas

CGSC Notes *continued from back cover*

and TRAC. We are encouraged by the great interest in our program and plan to continue to expand our services to meet the needs of the joint warfighters and the CGSC vision.

For information on our GCCS program, please access the A541-Advanced GCCS (JOPES) webpage at <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/djco/COURSES/A541/home.htm>> or go to the DJMO home page for the best in joint and multinational issues at <<http://www-cgsc.army.mil/djco/index.htm>>.

Combat Studies Institute

The Combat Studies Institute has several key activities in the works over the next several months. In April 2000, the Institute will hold its annual Military History Instructor's Course for ROTC, Army Reserve School, Army Service School and National Guard OCS history instructors. There are only 40 spaces available, so those interested need to get their bids in early.